Tradable discharge permits system for water pollution of the Upper Nanpan River, China by IDRC. Regional Office for Southeast and East Asia, Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia et al.
ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM 
FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Tradable Discharge Permits System for Water 
Pollution of the Upper Nanpan River, China 
Wendong Tao, Weimin Yang & Bo Zhou 
EEPSEA RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
EEPSEA is supported by a consortium of donors and administered by IDRC. 
Mailing Address: Tanglin PO Box 101, Singapore 912404 
Visiting Address: 7th Storey RELC Building, 30 Orange Grove Road 
Telephone: 65 235 1344 Fax: 65 235 1849 
Internet: dglover@idre.org.sg or hermi@laguna.net 
Website: http://www.idrc.org.sg/eepsea 
Comments should be sent to the authors at Yunnan Institute of Environmental Sciences or at 
Yunnan Environmental Protection Bureau, 23 Wang Jia Ba Kunming 650034, CHINA. 
E-mail: wtao@public.km.yn.cn or ftecd@public.km.yn.cn 
The Economy and Environment Program for South East Asia (EEPSEA) was established in 
May, 1993 to support research and training in environmental and resource economics. Its 
objective is to enhance local capacity to undertake the economic analysis of environmental 
problems and policies. It uses a local networking approach, involving courses, meetings, 
technical support, access to literature and opportunities for comparative research. Member 
countries are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, 
PNG and Sri Lanka. 
EEPSEA's funding is provided by a consortium of donors. As of June 1998, these sponsors 
consisted of IDRC (Canada), Sida (Sweden), Danida (Denmark), the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of Norway and the Netherlands and the MacArthur Foundation (USA). 
EEPSEA Research Reports are the outputs of research projects supported by EEPSEA. 
They have been peer reviewed and edited. In some cases, longer versions are available from 
the authors. EEPSEA also issues a Special Papers Series, consisting of commissioned papers 
emphasizing research methodology. 
EEPSEA is supported by a consortium of donors and administered by IDRC. 
Mailing Address: Tanglin PO Box 101, Singapore 912404 Visiting Address: 7th Storey RELC Building, 30 
Orange Grove Road Telephone: 65 235 1344 Fax: 65 235 1849 Internet: dglover@idrc.org.sg or 
hermi@laguna.net Website: http://www.idrc.org.sg/eepsea 
IDRC . Ctb. 
ECONOMY AND ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM 
FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Tradable Discharge Permits System for Water Pollution 
of the Upper Nanpan River, China 




This work was carried out with the aid of a small grant from EEPSEA. We wish to acknowledge the 
contributions of Dr. William F. Barron who provided continuous comments and suggestions. Our thanks 
also to Dr. David James, Dr. John Whalley, Dr. David Glover and Dr. Herminia Francisco, and to the many 
EEPSEA workshop participants for their useful comments and suggestions. We would like to thank the US 
EPA Region 5, NSW EPA of Australia and David James for providing valuable materials. 







2.1 Surface Water Problems in the Upper Nanpan River Catchment 4 
2.1.1 Hydrology and water quality 4 
2.1.2 Sources of pollutants 6 
2.2 Critical Actions for Water Pollution Control 9 
2.3 Options Available to Address Water Quality Problems 10 
2.3.1 Environmental management systems in place 10 
2.3.2 Effluent charge 10 
2.3.3 Stricter enforcement of existing 
command-and-control management systems 11 
2.4 Institutional Structure of Environmental Management 11 
2.5 Principles of Point/Point Source Trading 12 
2.6 Necessary Conditions of Point/Point Source Trading 12 
3. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF PS/PS TRADING: UPPER NANPAN 15 
3.1 Current Non-Tradable Discharge Permits System of the Upper Nanpan 15 
3.2 Public Participation 16 
3.3 Status of Upper Nanpan River 
Regarding Necessary Conditions for Ps/Ps Trading 17 
3.4 Specification of the TDP for Water Pollution of the Upper Nanpan River 21 
3.4.1 Objectives 21 
3.4.2 Controlled pollutants 21 
3.4.3 Trading zone 22 
3.4.4 Participants 22 
3.4.5 Total maximum daily loads and initial allocation of permits 23 
4. BENEFITS OF TRADING PROGRAM FOR THE UPPER NANPAN 
4.1 Remained Load Reduction Requirements 




4.3 Identification of Trading Opportunities 26 
4.4 Estimation of Cost-savings 28 
5. TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION 31 
5.1 Other Concerns Important for Implementation 31 
5.1.1 Design guidelines 31 
5.1.2 Reallocation of permits 32 
5.1.3 Compliance monitoring requirements 32 
5.1.4 Institutional structure and capacity-building 32 
5.1.5 Administrative and monitoring costs 32 
5.1.6 Social implications 33 
5.2 Follow-up Actions 33 
REFERENCES 35 
Table 1 
List of Tables and Figures 
Designated Water Uses 5 
Table 2 Current Situation of Major Water Quality Parameters 6 
.Table 3 Load Balance Of the Catchment 7 
Table 4 Remained Reduction of the Existing Participants for Cod Discharge 24 
Table 5 Scale Of Pollution Control Cost 
Relative To Cost Of Industrial Products 26 
Table 6 Illustration Of Cost-Effectiveness With And Without 
Trading To Meet Permit Limits-excluding municipal sources 29 
Table 7 Illustration Of Cost-Effectiveness With And Without 
Trading To Meet Permit Limits-including municipal sources 30 
Figure 1 Sketch of the Upper Nanpan River Catchment 8 
Figure 2 Illustration of the Process of Identifying Trading Opportunities 27 
Appendix 1 
Appendices 
Effluent Characteristics of Participants of Nontrading Permits System 38 
Appendix 2 Pollution Reduction Options and Costs of Potential Participants 39 
Tradable Discharge Permits System for Water Pollution 
of the Upper Nanpan River, China 
Wendong Tao', Weimin Yang2 and Bo Zhou3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The upper Nanpan river in Qujing city, Yunnan province, China is heavily polluted. 
Its main stream (122 km long) is designated as water for industrial and agricultural use. 
However, the instream water quality is unsuitable for any use. Industrial discharges and 
municipal sources contribute significantly to the river's pollutant loads which are much 
higher than the total maximum loads allowable (TMLAs). 
Substantial efforts have been made to correct the situation, but the water pollution 
is still out of control. At present, it appears that environmental management instruments 
must be improved, and more capital must be invested in water pollution control. Among 
several environmental management instruments implemented in the upper Nanpan 
river catchment area, the current non-tradable permits system for water pollution must 
be improved first through the development of a tradable discharge permits (TDP) system 
for water pollution. By providing flexibility to the dischargers, the trading system is 
assumed to be more cost-effective in attaining specific effluent reduction targets than 
the non-trading system. 
This report provides information on and analysis of point/point source effluent trading, 
an explanation of the theory underlying trading, an examination of international 
experiences to date, and an evaluation of the lessons learned. It also focuses on 
evaluating the applicability of a practical TDP system to the upper Nanpan river. With 
regard to the necessary conditions for point/point source trading, the catchment appears 
good. Since the trading program is developed on the basis of the current non-tradable 
permits system for water pollution, the catchment generally meets eight of the nine 
conditions: 
The water body is an identifiable river segment. 
Point sources contribute significantly to the river water pollution. At present, there 
are sufficient, diverse point sources. 
The TMLAs have been established under the current permits system and modified. 
Accurate and sufficient data on wastewater characteristics of major dischargers 
have been accumulated to develop pollution reduction options. However, a computer 
information system should be set up to update and take full advantage of the 
continuously changing data/information. 
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The concentration-based discharge requirements must, at a minimum, be met by 
all the industrial dischargers. 
The combination of the large remaining reduction requirements and the differential 
of unit costs of pollution reduction makes a large difference in pollution reduction 
costs across dischargers, consequently providing incentives for trading. 
The regulatory agencies support TDP and the dischargers do not oppose permit 
trading. 
There is an appropriate institutional structure for management of the trading program. 
Sufficient and effective compliance incentives and enforcement mechanisms need 
to be developed. 
A point/point source trading system for chemical oxygen demand (COD) and 5-day 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) discharge is proposed for the upper Nanpan river, 
with participants covering both existing and new point sources in a smaller trading 
zone, the vicinity of Xiping town and the urban center. The main objective is to achieve 
the total reduction targets (TRTs) at a lower total cost than the non-tradable permits 
system by providing opportunities for point sources that would otherwise have to install 
high-cost technologies to pay for generally less expensive point source controls. 
This project emphasizes economic analysis of COD discharges of the participants 
within the trading zone. Among the 18 industrial participants of the current permits 
system in the trading zone, 12 industrial dischargers and two main municipal sources 
are identified as potential participants of the trading program. The annual reduction 
cost, the sum of annualized capital cost and annual operation and maintenance (O&M) 
cost, is estimated and used to compare the cost-effectiveness of pollution reduction 
options. The first hand information sources consist of existing research reports, 
environmental impact statements, feasibility study reports, design specification, and 
permits application documents. The secondary information sources are government 
guidelines for best practical environmental protection technologies and cleaner 
production processes. While it would be better if there was direct cost information from 
dischargers, the sources used are relatively detailed and developed for the local 
conditions. Coefficients are used to make adjustments in the unit costs obtained from 
the secondary sources to fit to local conditions. The coefficients vary between 0.7 and 
1.0, accounting for the specific site condition, design capacity, wastewater characteristics, 
and so on. Hence, it is felt that a reasonable approximation is provided for actual reduction 
costs for individual polluters involved in the study. 
The trading opportunities are identified by comparing unit costs across all reduction 
options of the potential participants, with practical assumptions -the amount of allowance 
that could be traded should be large enough to install a certain unit treatment process; 
and few dischargers are assumed to solely seek financial gain by upgrading their 
treatment facilities and selling the excessive allowances. The potential benefit, direct 
reduction cost-savings, is the difference between the total cost if each discharger is 
required to achieve its permit limits by upgrading wastewater treatment facilities (WTFs) 
--without trading and the total cost if trading is allowed to be an alternative for the 
dischargers to achieve their permit limits --with trading. The results indicate that the 
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municipal sources must be covered by the trading program; there was one case of 
trade between the industrial participants, several trades between the Qujing municipal 
source and industrial sources, and one case of trade between the two municipal sources. 
These trading cases would gain an annual cost-saving of CNY2.4 million (8.3 Chinese 
Yuan = 1 US dollar), or 18.4 percent of the total annual cost to attain the COD TRT 
without trading. The unit price of the last trade, that can be approximately considered 
the marginal pollution reduction cost of the upper Nanpan river catchment, is CNY959/ 
kg COD/day. 
Another important finding is that the without trading and with trading options will, 
due to specific pollution control engineering, brings about 900.9 kg/day and 51.5 kg/ 
day of redundant reduction, respectively, beyond the required reduction. If the additional 
benefits associated with the without trading are considered, the net annual benefit arising 
from trading, CNY1.6 million, would still be significant. 
Estimating the benefits of any TDP system is difficult before the system is actually 
in place. If BOD data were used to estimate the cost-saving, results could be different. 
The research intends to help the government and industry accept the TDP system 
through approximation of the benefits from trading rather than an exact estimation of 
benefits. 
International experience related to the study has revealed a few other concerns 
important for implementing the TDP system: program design, reporting and monitoring 
requirements, institutional/administrative requirements, additional administrative and 
monitoring costs for trading, alternatives for initial allocation of permits, and social 
implications. Although these complex aspects would be addressed in depth at later 
stages, a few recommendations for elaborating the trading program are proposed: 
In program design, compliance monitoring and execution of institutional requirements 
must be considered. However, the program must be carefully designed to minimize 
administrative and transaction costs imposed on dischargers and regulatory 
agencies. 
The program design must be as simple as possible, at least for a pilot period, 
making provisions as explicit as feasible and minimizing the points of administrative 
intervention. 
Factors influencing participation, and consequently cost-savings, must be taken 
into account in trading program design. These factors include prevention of 
environmental 'hotspots', the probable monopolistic behavior of municipal sources 
that can inhibit trading by industrial dischargers, duration of permits, and initial 
wasteload allocation method. 
The program should be location specific, to consider existing market conditions, 
role of local government, and economic situation of the area. 
The management agency in charge of trading must have adequate statutory authority 
to allocate permits, reject trades that threaten local water quality, enforce compliance, 
and enact other permit provisions. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Every five years, the Yunnan Provincial Government formulates a socio-economic 
development plan which includes sections on environment. The eighth Five-Year Plan 
(1991-1995) targeted its effort on preventing and controlling water pollution of two bodies 
of water: the Dianchi lake in the provincial capital of Kunming and the Nanpan river. As 
part of the provincial government's initial efforts for the Nanpan River, a plan completed 
in 1994 (YIES 1995) proposed a comprehensive water pollution control program that 
included the development of a TDP system. The ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) also 
emphasized water pollution control for the river. 
At the time of the research, no concrete plan to develop a TDP has yet been made. 
However, managers of the Qujing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (QMEPB) 
and the Yunnan Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau (YPEPB) expressed strong 
interest in establishing the TDP system. This research is aimed at a) disseminating 
the concept of TDP, b) evaluating the applicability of a point/point source trading 
system to the upper Nanpan river in Qujing city, c) estimating the cost savings of 
effluent trading relative to non-trading, and d) identifying the concerns to be addressed 
later during elaboration of the trading program. The main objective was to attain the 
same TMLAs as the current non-tradable system but at a lower cost. 
The outputs of this research may serve as a technical basis for elaboration and 
design of a workable TDP system. 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Surface Water Problems in the Upper Nanpan River Catchment 
2.1.1 Hydrology and Water Quality 
The Nanpan river runs for 677 km in China's Yunnan province. It is a tributary of the 
Pearl river which merges with the South China Sea. The upper Nanpan river is 122 km 
long with a drainage area of 2486 square kilometers, stretching across Qujing city of 
Yunnan province, China. The monsoon brings to the catchment a mean annual rainfall 
of 811 mm with 80 percent of the annual precipitation falling in the rainy season (May to 
October). The river flow is highly variable yearly and seasonally. 
Based on the distribution of point pollution sources, the upper Nanpan river is divided 
into different subzones (YIES 1995): 
Subzone 1: Upstream of Huashan reservoir dam; length = 27.6 km 
Subzone 2: Huashan reservoir to Xiping town; length = 36.2 km 
Subzone 3: Xiping town to Qujing urban center; length = 21.9 km 
Subzone 4: Urban center to Yuezhou town; length = 16.3 km 
Subzone 5: Yuezhou town to Xiangshui reservoir; length = 19.7 km 
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The mainstream is designated as water for industrial and agricultural uses that 
require Class IV water quality set by the Surface Water Quality Standard of the People's 
Republic of China (SWQS). The river water is heavily polluted, and OLGTPS (1993) 
has designated the water quality objective of the mainstream as Class IV by year 2000 
and Class I I I by 2010. 
Table 1. Designated Water Uses (effective before 2000) 
Name of Water Body Designated Water Use/ 
Quality Requirement 
Current Uses 
Mainstream of Nanpan River 
from dam of Huashan Reservoir 
to Xiangshui Reservoir 
Huashan Reservoir 
Tributaries of Huashan Reservoir 
Industrial use/Class IV 
Potential source of 
drinking water/Class II 
Headwater/Class I 
Irrigation and industrial use 
Irrigation and industrial use 
Irrigation 
According to the SWQS, the water quality from Class V to I becomes better and the 
corresponding uses change as follows: 
Class I - headwater and national nature reserve; 
Class II - the first level protected area for the centralized drinking water source, waters for 
precious fish, and the spawning ground of fish and shrimps; 
Class III - the second level protected area for the centralized drinking water source and 
waters for common fish and swimming; 
Class IV - waters for general industrial supply and non-contact water recreation; and 
Class V - waters for agricultural supply and waters as common scenery. 
Source: YIES, 1995 
Regular water quality monitoring is conducted at four instream sections sampled 
six times a year. Monitoring results in recent years (YIES 1995) indicated that the water 
quality was much worse than the use requirements of Class IV, and that COD, BOD5 
and ammonia nitrogen (NH3-N) were the critical pollutants. The water quality of its 
mainstream could not meet the lowest limits (Class V) of the SWQS in terms of BOD5, 
COD and NH3 N, especially during low-flow seasons. In other words, the river water is 
not suitable for any use. 
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Many rural enterprises concentrated in the urban center of Qujing and in the vicinity of 
the three towns along the river. The majority of these fell into the categories of building 
material manufacturing, food processing, textile and papermaking. It was estimated that 
rural enterprises contributed about 26.1% of industrial COD load to the upper Nanpan 
River. The non-tradable permits system neglected their contributions to river water pollution. 
Fortunately, the State Council's Decision Concerning Several Issues in Environmental 
Protection, a circular released in September 1996, stressed that the small enterprises 
with indigenous production processes must be closed down before September 30, 1996. 
For example, the pulp and paper mills with annual output lower than 5000 tons pulp are at 
the top of the closure list. Since then, the polluting rural enterprises have been nearly 
phased out. 









NH; N Load 
ton/yr 
Year1993 
Municipal 52 396 2 875.0 7187.5 718.8 
Industrial 39 048 820.4 3495.6 1 325.1 
Nonpoint 777.0 4143.0 135.0 
Subsum 4472.4 14826.1 2178.9 
Year2000 
Municipal 77 987 5 069.1 10137.5 854.1 
Industrial 51 393 1 085.7 4 388.5 1 907.1 
Nonpoint 777.0 4143.0 135.0 
Subsum 6931.8 18669.0 2896.2 
Year 2010 
Municipal 202 555 14678.9 29 359.6 2 218.1 
Industrial 62 233 1 189.1 4 742.6 1 976.2 
Nonpoint 777.0 4143.0 135.0 
Subsum 16 645.0 38 245.2 4 329.3 
Total Maximum Loads Allowable2 
By Year 2000 1 686.7 5536.7 878.5 
By Year 2010 987.1 4113.4 84.3 
1 Without consideration of the proposed Qujing Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plant. 
2 Total maximum loads allowable, TMLA, are calculated at the mean lowest monthly instream flow. 
3 Value analyzed using potassium dichromate method. 
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Existing Industrial Dischargers 
Xuanwei Phosphorus Plant- 
Huashan 
Yunnan Vinylon Factory 




Firms Gone to Bankrupt 





Existing Industrial Dischargers 
Guihua Paper Mill 
Kangli Pharmaceutical Plant 
Lanjian Automobile Factory 
Qujing Cigarette Factory 
Qujing Highway Transportation Station 
Qujing Municipal Beverage Plant 
Qujing Municipal Food Company: Processing Plant 
Qujing Municipal Leather-Tanning Plant 
Qujing Prefectural Incorporated Meat Plant 
Qujing Prefectural Machinery Plant 
Qujing Prefectural Pharmaceutical Plant 
Qujing Tabacco-processing Plant 
Qujing Textile Mill 
O Yuezhou 
Existing Industrial Dischargers 
Qujing Municipal Brewery 
Qujing Municipal Phosphate 
Chemical Plant 
Zhanyi Automobile Repairing Factory 
Zhanyi Phosphate Fertilizer Plant 
Zhanyi Wool Textile Mill 
New Entry 
Qujing Iron & Steel Works 
Existing Industrial Dischargers 
Qujing Chemical Plant 
Yuezhou Iron & Steel Works 
Growth 
Yunnan Coal Chemical Plant: 
innovation 
Yuezhou Iron & Steel Works: 
innovation 
Yuezhou Power Plant: 
expansion 
Firms Gone to Bankrupt 
Qujing Dying & Printing Mill 
Qujing Silk Plant 
New Entry 
Qujing Municipal Sodium Tdpolyphosphate Plant 
Qujing Municipal Yongan Pharmaceutical Plant 
Protein & Potato-processing Mill 
Growth 
Qujing Cigarette Factory: expansion of tobacco-processing 
Zhanyi Wool Textile Mill: expansion 
Qujing Municipal Leather-tanning Plant: innovation 
Figurel. Sketch of the Upper Nanpan River Catchment 
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Industrial development and urbanization played an important role in poverty 
alleviation. On the other hand, increasing industrial effluents and municipal sewage 
contributed to the deterioration of river water quality. As one of the major development 
zones in Yunnan province, Qujing city will be the site of remarkable change in terms of 
gross industrial output value and urban population (YIES, 1995). The pollutant loads 
will be much larger than the TMLAs. Water pollution prevention and control will be a 
significant challenge to the catchment. Nonpoint sources contribute somewhat toward 
instream water pollution, though contribution of point sources (industrial and municipal) 
is, and will be more, significant. In other words, controlling of point sources would make 
a significant difference in the river water quality. 
2.2 Critical Actions for Water Pollution Control 
With increasing amounts of pollutant loads produced due to accelerated economic 
development, water quality objectives became impossible to attain by enforcing the 
concentration limits of the existing national discharge standard (OLGTPS 1993). 
Therefore, a non-tradable permits system for water pollution of the upper Nanpan river 
in Qujing city was developed. It was designed to control effluent discharges of point 
sources in terms of the total daily loads of NH3 N, COD, fluoride, cyanide, phenol, and 
lead. The permits system has been tested since 1992 and wasteload allocations for 
industrial point sources were granted to the 30 major industrial dischargers. 
Wasteload allocation considered the municipal sources, but no compliance 
requirements were designated. To pass the World Bank loan appraisal for the Qujing 
Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plant (QMWTP), the feasibility study and design work 
have been completed. Construction is anticipated to commence this year. The QMWTP 
is designed to collect and treat the municipal wastewater from the Qujing urban center, 
with a design capacity of 70,000 ton/day before 2000. The ultimate capacity will be up 
to 150,000 ton/day. 
The Yunnan provincial government has resolved to carry out comprehensive water 
pollution control. Thus the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Planning of the Upper 
Nanpan River Basin (YIES 1995) was completed in 1994. The planning involved 
extensive preliminary examination of pollution control options of almost all 30 major 
industrial dischargers. It examined in detail pollution control of five crucial industrial 
dischargers and domestic sewage systems. As mentioned earlier, its recommendation 
for the construction of a municipal wastewater treatment plant in the urban center has 
been implemented. It also suggested the trading system (i.e., the trading program would 
be an integral part of the whole comprehensive water pollution control plan). 
The planning report laid a foundation for data/information collection and analysis of 
this project, including ambient water quality monitoring results, full profile of existing 
dischargers, prediction of future discharges, TMLAs for each instream subzones; and 
preliminary examination against pollution control options of major industrial dischargers 
and municipal sources. 
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2.3 Options Available to Address Water Quality Problems 
2.3.1 Environmental management systems in place 
The current non-tradable permits system is a component of a larger comprehensive 
environmental management strategy for pollution control of the upper Nanpan river. It 
covers the following: 
Environmental impact assessment of construction projects; 
"2-in-1 at three phases" for construction projects (i.e., the pollution control facilities 
must be designed, installed and operated parallel to the main engineering); 
Over-standard effluent charges; 
Responsibility system for attaining environmental targets; 
Quantitative examination of comprehensive treatment of urban environments; 
Deadline control of major industrial pollution sources; 
Permits system; and 
Centralized pollution control. 
A preliminary examination (Tao 1995; YIES 1995) determined that even if a 
combination of the existing water pollution control instruments could achieve the TRTs, 
the approach would not be cost-effective with respect to the difference in unit reduction 
costs across dischargers. Thus, a TDP system was proposed. 
2.3.2 Effluent charge 
China's experience with effluent charge has not been studied systematically, but 
anecdotal critiques have created the impression that the system is arbitrarily administered 
and ineffective as a pollution control instrument (Wang and Wheeler 1996). Yun (1997) 
found that 76 percent of enterprises believed that it served more to enhance the 
environmental conscience than as an incentive to pollution control. 
The levy system only charges against the discharge in excess of the effluent standard. 
It is commonly believed that the levy in China provides little incentive to control 
pollution because official rates are below marginal abatement costs (Wang and 
Wheeler 1996). 
Most dischargers consider the levy system as a financing mechanism so that the 
fee cannot be levied in full at the low rate, not to mention raising the rate to the 
marginal reduction cost. Strictness of enforcement is thought to vary widely, so 
factories in different regions face very different penalties for polluting (Wang and 
Wheeler 1996). 
The charge level could be changed upward overtime. In fact, such small increases 
have always been affected by inflation. As a result, such efforts contribute little to 
improvement. 
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Nevertheless, Wang and Wheeler (1996) concluded that the water pollution levy in 
China had been more effective than previously assumed, although there was undoubtedly 
much room for improvement. According to the relevant regulations, the effluent fee in 
China will be charged against the total pollutant load rather than only the over-standard 
load. 
In general, shift of current non-tradable permits system to the TDP does not contradict 
with improvements of the levy system. It is possible to design economic instruments 
that contain elements of price and/or quantity controls, such as tradable permits combined 
with effluent fees (NSW EPA, March 1994). A survey on Chinese enterprises' behavior 
(Yun 1997) also found that 43% - 55% of the interviewed enterprises preferred 'controlling 
pollution while paying the charges'. 
2.3.3 Stricter enforcement of existing command-and-control management systems 
In theory, a similar outcome of market-based instruments could be achieved by a 
central authority applying traditional command-and-control techniques. However, 
interviews in the United States indicated that regulators were generally reluctant to 
allocate load reduction requirements on the basis of marginal costs, because this 
approach was viewed as less equitable than options based solely on pollutant loading 
(US EPA, May 1992). Traditional approaches may have higher administrative costs 
than trading, because they would require central collection and analysis of cost data. In 
addition, dischargers are likely to protest schemes that allocate a larger share of the 
control costs to them if there is no mechanism to provide monetary compensation (US 
EPA May 1992). 
As a matter of fact, even full enforcement of existing concentration-based discharge 
standards - Integrated Wastewater Discharge Standard of the People's Republic of 
China (IWDS) - could not keep the total discharge loads under the TMLAs (OLGTPS 
1993; YIES 1995). Nevertheless, some form of direct regulation will be necessary to 
support market mechanisms or to reach management objectives other than economic 
efficiency (NSW EPA, March 1994). For example, one of the necessary conditions for a 
successful TDP program is that the IWDS must be met. 
2.4 Institutional Structure of Environmental Management 
The administrative agencies in charge of environmental protection in China consist 
of those at the state, province, prefecture/city, and county levels. They administer and 
supervise environmental protection affairs within their areas of jurisdiction. 
The Qujing Prefectural Environmental Protection Bureau (QPEPB) and QMEPB 
are executors of national and/or local laws, regulations and policies on environmental 
protection. The Qujing Municipal Leaders Group for Testing the Permits System for 
Water Pollution (LGTPS) was established temporarily to take charge of coordinating 
pertinent sectors and approving wasteload allocations under the permits system. LGTPS 
comprised leaders of QPEPB, QMEPB, and other associated government agencies. 
Since January 1993, LGTPS has delegated the management and supervision of permits 
of the city-owned industrial dischargers and province/prefecture-owned dischargers to 
QMEPB and QPEPB, respectively. Such decisions as adopting the TDP will be made 
by the EPBs. 
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2.5 Principles of Point/Point Source Trading 
Under the traditional 'command-and-control' approach to water quality protection, 
dischargers are required to comply with effluent limitations, but no direct incentive exists 
if they take additional steps to further reduce their discharges (US EPA, April 1992). 
Trading programs seek to achieve pollution reduction targets in the most cost-effective 
manner by providing flexibility to the dischargers. By establishing a market for buying 
and selling such allowances among themselves, the economic incentives provided by 
the market forces presumably allocate the control requirements to the dischargers with 
the lowest control costs. To date, three distinct trading scenarios (US EPA, April 1992) 
have emerged: 
those that permit trades only among point sources (PS/PS trading); 
those that permit trades between point sources and nonpoint sources; and 
those that permit trades between nonpoint sources. 
The theory underlying effluent trading is based on marginal cost analysis (US EPA, 
April 1992). The marginal costs of technological control measures differ among point 
sources. Under PS/PS trading, a regulated point source is allowed to avoid upgrading 
its pollution control technology to meet permit limits if it pays for equivalent (or greater) 
reductions in one or more other point sources within the allowed trading area. Presumably, 
the plants might pay for reductions at the plant that could achieve the lowest pound-for- 
pound reduction costs until the reduction targets are met or until the marginal cost of 
treatment is equalized among the point sources (US EPA, May 1992). 
The dollar values of costs and benefits of trading programs will vary according to 
water body size, number and type of affected dischargers, and program design (US 
EPA, May 1992). Theoretically, benefits that might result from trading relative to non- 
trading policy include the following: 
producing direct cost savings from trading; 
providing the dischargers with flexibility to control pollution; 
providing incentives to develop more cost-effective pollution control systems; and, 
minimizing delays in complying with effluent reductions. 
The actual results of PS/PS trading should be relatively certain because it is easier 
to monitor point sources than nonpoint sources (US EPA, May 1992). However, this 
scenario does not present a truly comprehensive solution to water quality problems 
where non-point sources are significant. 
2.6 Necessary Conditions of Point/Point Source Trading 
A PS/PS trading program is considered efficient and effective if it achieves pollution 
reduction targets at the lowest aggregate cost, including point source controls and 
administrative costs. However, many economic, technical, and institutional factors must 
be considered when developing a trading program for a specific catchment. The case 
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studies of specific water bodies, national screening analysis, and the Fox River 
experience in the USA, have identified several conditions that appear necessary for an 
efficient and effective trading program (US EPA, April 1992; US EPA, May 1992). This 
report extracts the necessary conditions for an efficient and effective PS/PS trading 
program. Key elements include the following: 
Identifiable catchment 
The trading must be confined to an identifiable watershed or segment. This will 
facilitate the management of the trading program by establishing the boundaries in 
which trading is allowed and delineating the area that will be monitored for water quality 
improvement as a result of trading. 
Significant and sufficient point sources 
The point sources must contribute a significant portion of the total pollutant load, 
and the water quality problem must result from multiple point source dischargers in 
order for trades to be possible. The more diverse the dischargers, the more likely that 
trades beneficial to both the traders and the environment will take place. 
Established total maximum discharge loads allowable 
There must be a positive difference between the existing or projected discharge 
loading and the TMLA that provides a practical base to force action. The TMLA and the 
resulting loading allowances then serve as part of the basis for dischargers to evaluate 
the cost-effectiveness of further controls to meet these limits. It also serves as the base 
against which reductions are measured and effectiveness of the trading approach can 
be determined. The TMLA is designed to achieve a specified ambient water quality 
objective. It may reflect a reduction over current point source loading, and may decrease 
over time to force improvement of water quality. 
Accurate and sufficient data 
Reliable and sufficient data and information about water quality, pollutant loads and 
water quality effects are necessary to determine TMLAs and TRTs, and measure 
reductions. Stream characteristics and the distance between dischargers are such that 
the further load reductions contributed by each discharger can be shifted while still 
meeting overall water quality objectives. It is also necessary to have detailed information 
about point source facilities in order to determine the marginal costs of point source 
controls. 
Required discharge limitations 
Point sources must meet and continue to meet, at a minimum, the national/local 
discharge standards. Trading may not result in increased loading for any individual 
point source above that allowed by technology-based or concentration-based discharge 
requirements. Some point source facilities are required to upgrade treatments, otherwise 
there will be no reason to trade. Furthermore, trading must result in significant reductions 
for a trading program to have significant impact on water quality, and thus reduce the 
likelihood that point sources will be required to meet more stringent discharge limits. 
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Large difference of treatment costs across dischargers 
The relative cost-effectiveness of treatment across the affected dischargers 
influences the benefits from trading because it determines the savings that can accrue 
as trading shifts treatment requirements from high-cost dischargers to those with lower 
costs. Current (or anticipated future) treatment costs must differ across dischargers by 
a large enough amount to provide incentives for trading; there must be significant load 
reductions remaining accompanied by a large difference in marginal costs across 
individual dischargers. Otherwise, there is no incentive for trade to achieve reduction 
targets. 
Acceptance of community and regulatory agency 
Factors influencing participation must be addressed in the program planning stage. 
These include the regulatory agency's perceptions of the effects of trading on 
environmental quality, the willingness and potential capacity to carry additional workloads, 
and the competitive pressures that can inhibit trading by industrial dischargers. 
Dischargers may have chosen not to participate in trades for reasons (e.g., desire 
to increase market share) beyond the scope of the program. Then, the local community 
must support a trading program as one way to achieve pollution reduction targets. 
Adequate institutional structure 
While trading programs are based on market incentives, they cannot rely entirely 
on market forces to result in attainment of water quality objectives. There must be an 
institutional structure to facilitate trading, design the program so that it encourages 
dischargers to engage in trades, and monitor program results. Because trades affect 
the permit requirements of dischargers, feedback is needed by the agency responsible 
for permit issuance, review, and enforcement. In addition, if water quality objectives are 
not being met under a trading program, then the implementing agency needs to be able 
to revise permit levels, trading rules, and possibly program design. Basically, the TDP 
management institution must have adequate legal authority. 
Adequate compliance incentives and enforcement mechanisms 
A program that departs from traditional point source permit requirements raises 
compliance concerns. Implementation mechanisms are important in creating compliance 
incentives where economic incentives are absent or have failed. A sufficient and effective 
implementation mechanism must be a component of the trading system. Inadequate 
enforcement could mean loss of any environmental gains made from controlling 
discharges, whether through a trading scheme or direct regulation. 
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3.0 POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF PS/PS TRADING 
TO THE UPPER NANPAN RIVER 
3.1 Current Non-Tradable Discharge Permits System of the Upper Nanpan 
Thirty major industrial enterprises along the upper Nanpan river in Qujing city were 
determined to be the participants of the non-tradable permit system (see Appendix 1). 
Statistic analysis found (YIES, 1995; OLGTPS, 1993) that COD, BOD5 and NH3-N were 
the crucial pollutants. The discharges of COD and BOD5of the 30 participants amounted 
to about 80% of the total industrial loads; and NH3-N discharge of the 30 participants 
amounted up to nearly 100% of the total industrial loads (YIES, 1995; OLGTPS, 1993)., 
The percentage must be higher for small enterprises with indigenous production 
processes since September 1996, at least over 90 % for COD and BOD discharge if 
giving an empirical estimation. 
The current non-tradable permits system was designed to control effluent discharges 
of point sources in terms of daily TMLA of NH3 N, COD, fluoride, cyanide, phenol and 
lead. The permits system now covers the upper Nanpan river segment downstream of 
the Huashan reservoir, including instream subzone 2-5. 
The TMLAs aimed at by the permits system (either trading or non-trading) were 
derived with consideration of the water quality background - baseline at the Huashan 
reservoir. Research (YIES 1995; OLGTPS 1993) found that the TMLAs for crucial 
pollutants of the upper Nanpan river were much less during the low-flow seasons than 
during high-flow conditions. Thus, the nontrading permits system uses the TMLAs derived 
from the low-flow instream conditions. The 1-in-10-year monthly low flow is usually 
employed for water quality control in China. 
Initial waste allocation of the TMLAs adopted 'grandfathering' - an allocation of 
permits to existing sources commonly based on historical discharge levels. The municipal 
allocations were first calculated and the residue was then given to the industrial sources. 
The same formula of wasteload allocations for the regulated pollutants was adopted 
(OLGTPS 1993) as follows: 
Municipal allocation = TMLA * (Current municipal load/(Current municipal load + 
Current industrial load)) 
Industrial allocation = TMLA - Municipal allocation 
Allowances of major industrial discharger i = Industrial allocation * (Standard 
discharge of discharger i) / E (Standard discharge of discharger i) 
Standard discharge of discharger i = Volume * Discharge standard in concentration 
Allocations for minor industrial dischargers and growth/entry = Industrial allocation 
- E (Allowances of major industrial discharger i) 
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Industrial wasteload allocation was given to the 30 major existing industrial 
dischargers (Appendix 1) and the deadlines for meeting the effluent limits were delineated 
specific to each permit holder. The farthest compliance deadline is December 1999. In 
fact, some dischargers had not made their effluent meet the permit limits by the deadline 
owing to weak enforcement to a great extent. 
Those enterprises that contribute little to the river water pollution are not covered by 
the permits system and are required only to comply with the national IWDS in terms of 
pollutant concentration. Discharges of the other pollutants are also controlled by the 
IWDS. 
In principle, the current permit system apportioned the TMLAs among the major 
existing industrial dischargers, major new industrial sources, and the municipal sources 
(i.e., the current permit system did consider the future industrial growth/entry). However, 
no meaningful amount of wasteload allocations was reserved for new point sources 
when wasteload was allocated initially. 
3.2 Public Participation 
For the upper Nanpan river catchment, perhaps the most significant obstacle to the 
TDP system as a management alternative is the lack of acquaintance with the trading 
concept and a shortfall of funds to develop practical technical guidelines and an 
administrative framework. This project provided the local environment managers and 
the dischargers with an opportunity to participate. It also disseminated TDP concepts, 
and subsequently helped in acceptance of the trading program, through two seminars 
and other contacts: 
Local seminar 1, May 19-20, 1997 at Qujing-mainly on disseminating the permits 
trading concept to environmental managers. The participants came from 
environmental protection bureaus, environmental monitoring centers and other 
relevant organizations in the Nanpan river basin. 
Local seminar 2, August 14-15, 1997 at Qujing-mainly on disseminating the 
preliminary findings of this study to environmental managers and potential trading 
participants. The participants came from environmental protection bureaus, 
environmental monitoring centers, and potential trading participants in the upper 
Nanpan river catchment. 
Contacts with the industries during additional collection of data and information for 
this study. 
A meeting with the leaders of QPEPB and QMEPB during the project adviser's visit 
in February to the upper Nanpan river. 
Since these local seminars and other contacts were solely non-governmental, the 
seminar participants and interviewees from the industries would not write their opinions 
of the proposed trading system. However, their casual remarks indicate the following: 
They had always overlooked the need for careful TDP program design; thus, the 
program must be designed as simply as possible, at least for the pilot period. 
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The managers were worried about the permit reallocation method and permit lifespan 
because of the more acute problems of equity and financial benefits under the 
trading program. One thing the industries commonly worried about was whether 
they would get their excessive allowances while permits were reallocated. 
Both managers and industries surmised relatively low transaction costs. 
At the planning stage of the trading system, it was difficult to get seminar participants 
to express what would make them participate in the trading. Most of their comments 
were as general as "The program is promising theoretically" and "We'd like to seek 
trades as an alternative to attain our pollution permit limits if the government puts 
the trading system into effect." 
3.3 Status of Upper Nanpan River Regarding Necessary Conditions for PS/PS 
Trading 
The trading will not be uniformly applicable to all watersheds or segments. The 
absence of one or more necessary condition will result in the delay of trading or will 
eliminate the need to shift to trading. This part examines the upper Nanpan river 
catchment for presence of the necessary conditions for an efficient and effective point/ 
point source trading program, and evaluates the degree to which the catchment meets 
these conditions. 
In general, future prospects appear good for a PS/PS trading program for the upper 
Nanpan river catchment. The catchment meets eight of the nine conditions. Meanwhile, 
recommendations for dealing with the inadequacy or constraints are proposed. 
Is the Waterbody Identifiable as a Watershed or Segment? Yes 
The upper Nanpan river is an identifiable water segment within the larger Nanpan 
river basin. This segment is entirely in the jurisdiction of Qujing city, and is divided into 
five subzones (see Section 1). The reach covering instream subzones 2-5 has been 
identified as a discrete segment for the current permits system. The effluent trading 
zone may be confined either to the same area as that of the current system or to certain 
subzones. 
Are Point Sources Dominant and are there Sufficient Point Sources? Yes 
Nonpoint sources contribute somewhat toward instream water pollution, though 
point sources (industrial and municipal) contribute significantly to the total loads of the 
crucial pollutants and will be dominant (Table 3). In addition, a certain part of the nonpoint 
source load is natural or uncontrollable. Comparison of the current and projected 
discharges with the TMIAs, manifests that the enforcement of point source pollution 
controls alone would make the TMLAs attainable (with exception of the TMLA of NH3 N 
by 2010). 
Nearly 30 existing industrial dischargers participating in the current permits system, 
future industrial growth/entry, and the municipal sources could form a wider trading 
market. The existing and future industrial dischargers encompass diverse sectors such 
as chemical industries, textile, papermaking, food processing, brewery, and machinery. 
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With respect to the pilot program in a smaller trading zone proposed hereinafter, 
there are 18 industrial and two municipal participants. Twelve potential industrial and 
two municipal traders were identified, which could form a relatively thick trading market 
in comparison to the number of potential traders in the American case studies. 
Have the Total Maximum Loads Allowable Been Established? In general, yes 
A non-tradable permits system for water pollutant discharge is in place in the upper 
Nanpan river catchment. A detailed TDP program could be developed on the basis of 
the current permits system, or TMLAs and TRTs for the regulated pollutants could be 
handed down. The existing wasteload allocations may also be adapted as an options 
for initial allocation for trading. 
The technical report of the current non-tradable permits system (OLGTPS 1993) 
used a very simple model for calculating the TMLAs of its regulated pollutants, 
considering the whole upper Nanpan mainstream as a fully-mixing flow with uniform 
degradation coefficients. The substantial defect of the water quality model is that it 
could not adequately examine the water quality effects. At the same time, it sets forth 
the need for developing more accurate water quality models to improve the accuracy 
and reliability of the modeling. YIES (1995) developed one-dimensional instream water 
quality.models for NH3 N, CODcr, and BOD5. These new models can be used to develop 
more reliable TMLAs of each instream subzone and to modify allocations while designing 
the trading program. 
Are there Accurate and Sufficient Data? In general, yes 
All the participants are required to report their discharges - monthly for dischargers 
with monitoring capacity, quarterly for major dischargers, and annually for small 
dischargers. Occasional monitoring at the outlets is undertaken for compliance 
inspection. The discharges are always monitored when environmental impact 
assessment is conducted for expansion or renovation purposes. 
The YIES (1995) has assessed the wastewater characteristics of the major 
dischargers and investigated water pollution control strategies and associated costs of 
individual dischargers. In the preparation phase of the QMWTP, the costs of urban 
wastewater treatment have been studied extensively with different design capacity and 
effluent limitations. In order to comply with the permit limits and meet deadline control 
requirements, many industrial dischargers themselves have investigated their water 
pollution control options and associated costs. 
One important fact is that these data and information are kept by different managers 
of the EPBs, research institutions and other persons/organizations. Thus, data/ 
information differences among sources are common. Most of the data used by this 
project are from YIES (1995) which presented coherent sets of data about the discharge 
characteristics and the instream water quality as of 1993. To make full use of these 
continuously developed data/information, a computer information system should be set 
up. The system would save on resources of both regulatory agencies and players of 
effluent trading. 
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Must the Concentration- or Technology-based Discharge Requirements Be Met At a 
Minimum? Yes 
In general, TMLA is developed and enforced for catchments where concentration- 
or technology-based discharge requirements could not maintain or attain the designated 
water quality objectives. In such cases, TMLA is assumed to be a more stringent 
discharge limit. Except for the municipal sources, all industrial point sources in the 
catchment must, at a minimum, meet the concentration-based discharge requirements 
of the IWDS. 
The IWDS imposes different requirements upon existing and future sources. A new 
industrial source must be designed to meet the IWDS if there is no wasteload allocation, 
and has to meet both the IWDS and the mass load requirements if wasteload allocation 
has been done. All the existing industrial dischargers must meet the discharge 
requirements of IWDS by year 2000. 
With respect to the industrial dischargers registering for the current permits system, 
about half of the participants are facing requirements to increase reductions both to 
meet their effluent limitations and to achieve permit limits. 
Is there a Large Difference in Treatment Costs Across Dischargers? Yes 
At the time the initial allocations for COD discharge were approved by the LGTPS, 
13 of the 26 industrial participants faced significant reductions and 13 held allowances 
for COD discharge equal to or a little higher than their actual discharges (Appendix 1). 
To date, few industrial participants had achieved their permit limits by upgrading treatment 
capabilities. One facing significant reduction was almost bankrupt. The municipal sources 
received wasteload allocations, but no permit limits were put on municipal wastewater 
discharge. Therefore, the remaining reductions were large enough for potential trading. 
As a result of the wasteload allocation and dischargers' efforts to achieve their 
permit limits, some of the existing dischargers possessed allocations, a few faced 
advanced treatment requirements, and others only needed primary treatment. Analysis 
on pollution control options and associated costs is conducted (Appendix 3) and shows 
that the remaining large reductions are accompanied by difference in annual unit costs 
of pollution control across dischargers (from CNY88.6/kgCOD/day to CNY7393.3/ 
kgCOD/day). The combination of required reductions and unit costs makes a large 
enough difference in treatment costs across dischargers, consequently providing 
incentives for trading (Tables 6 and 7). 
Do the Regulatory Agency and Dischargers Accept the TDP Program? Yes 
Although a national or local regulatory/administrative framework of TDP system for 
water pollution does not exist, China has generally approved the rights to trade permits. 
The amended (1996) Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of People's Republic 
of China delegates to local government the decision to adopt trading to meet TMLAs. 
Even if the TDP is applicable economically and technically to the upper Nanpan river, 
whether or not the program is adopted will depend to a certain extent upon the managers' 
opinions. QMEPB staff were supportive of and committed to trading. 
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The industrial dischargers were not familiar with the trading concept prior to this 
study. To what extent they would seek to trade permits was difficult to determine, though 
no one expressed opposition to the trading program during the local seminars and 
occasional contact with industries. 
QMWTP will be constructed with a World Bank loan and domestic investment. The 
World Bank required that the Plant be managed by a private entity. According to relevant 
state regulations, fees- could be charged against its users to repay the investment. 
Moreover, the Plant will be the largest participant of the trading program in terms of 
wasteloads. That would ensure it a positive position in the trading market. 
Wasteloads of municipal sources are less subject to market changes over time 
compared to industrial sources. Since their loads are relatively predictable, municipal 
sources may buy short-term discharge allowances while waiting for a specific level of 
load increment to upgrade their treatment facilities. They could also sell their excessive 
allowances for given periods to avoid wasting their newly-extended wastewater treatment 
capacity. Considering all these, it is felt that the municipal sources will participate in 
permits trading actively and seek to make money in the trading market. 
Is there an Appropriate Institutional Structure? In general, yes 
The region has a sufficient capacity for environmental monitoring in support of trades. 
The Qujing Municipal Monitoring Station and the Qujing Prefectural Monitoring Station 
carry out instream water monitoring and effluent monitoring on a regular basis under 
the National/Provincial Environmental Monitoring Networks. Occasionally, they assist 
in environmental impact assessments and other activities. 
Although a specific institutional structure to facilitate trading and design the program 
needs to be determined formally, QMEPB and QPEPB appear to be good candidates 
for assuming all of this authority/responsibility. They have shown their capability for 
permits system management, though both are in need of further capacity building. 
Are Sufficient and Effective Compliance Incentives and Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Place? In general, no 
Under the current permits system, whether a polluter complies with its permit limits 
is commonly assessed through self-reporting of discharges and occasional monitoring 
of results. On one hand, the EPBs do not have enough personnel and resources to 
conduct unannounced checks. On the other hand, bargaining is the predominant 
phenomenon in economic activities owing to the special relationship between the 
government and the enterprises (Yun 1997). With respect to discharge permits, they 
may bargain either to extend the deadline to comply with their permit limits, or to get rid 
themselves of/reduce the penalty for non-compliance. Enterprise behavior is determined 
not only by internal motivation, but by the external environment which includes the 
changing economic system and enforcement by authorities, among others (Yun 1997). 
It is felt that implementation mechanisms are not yet in place. If these constraints are 
resolved, the upper Nanpan river stands an excellent chance of developing a successful 
PS/PS trading program. 
The National Environmental Protection Agency of China has realized there are 
enforcement problems and is seeking technical assistance to formulate an enforcement 
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policy of environmental legislation. Moreover, environmental performance motivates 
enterprises to invest in pollution control as China's market system expands. 
The compliance incentive is highly affiliated with design. Therefore, this study sets 
forth other concerns important to implementation (e.g., permit reallocation method, 
compliance monitoring, design guidelines). One important thing that is beyondthe trading 
program design but that should be given attention is that public exposure through mass 
media always has remarkable influence on the polluter's behavior in China. 
3.4 Specification of the TDP for Water Pollution of the Upper Nanpan River 
Careful program design is needed to ensure that the predicted benefits of trading 
accrue in practice. Here it is not intended that the design issues be addressed. However, 
to illustrate the cost savings of the trading program, the scope and objective-pollutants 
to be covered, geographical area, participants and total maximum loads allowable-are 
specified first. 
Thus, point/point source trading system for COD and BOD5 discharge is proposed 
for the upper Nanpan river, covering both existing and new point pollution sources in 
the vicinity of Xiping town and the Qujing urban center. The trading system will be 
based on the current non-tradable permits system. It will impose market forces upon 
the permits system to provide the dischargers with flexibility in pollution control. 
3.4.1 Objectives 
The point/point source trading system for the Nanpan river segment is proposed for 
the following reasons: 
to achieve the TRTs at lower total cost than the nontrading permits system; 
to provide opportunities for point sources that would otherwise have to install high- 
cost technologies to pay for generally less expensive point source controls (i.e., in 
a flexible manner); and 
to provide a way to ensure ongoing financial incentives to further reduce pollution. 
Further, trades can be used for relatively short-term periods to cover emergencies, 
and to allow short-term shutdowns in the wastewater treatment facilities. They can be 
sold when planned production shutdowns occur. 
3.4.2 Controlled Pollutants 
Effluent trading, more than regulations, could be a more efficient means of controlling 
discharges of non-persistent pollutants into water (Government of Canada 1992). 
Assessment found that at least before the year 2010, only the crucial pollutants of NH3 
N, COD and BOD5will be suitable for total mass loading control. It would be simpler to 
manage and more effective to control other pollutants by the concentration approach 
(Tao 1995; YIES 1995). Nevertheless, NH3 N is, and will be, from only a few dischargers. 
Both the non-tradable and tradable permits system use the approach of total mass 
loading control. Therefore, COD and BOD5 are proposed as the pollutants to be controlled 
by the trading system. 
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The controlled pollutants are those for which discharge allowances could be traded 
among participants in the trading system. Pollutants should be subject to separate 
trading programs because their environmental impacts are different (Government of 
Canada 1992). Principally, allowances for COD and BOD5 should be traded separately 
in the Upper Nanpan river. Considering the common characteristic of oxygen 
consumption due to both COD and BOD5, it seems proper to allow trades between 
COD and BOD5 as long as an appropriate trading ratio is specified. But this design 
issue is beyond the reach of the project. 
3.4.3 Trading Zone 
The trading zone of permits system is the geographical area within which dischargers 
of a given pollutant would be allowed to buy and sell permit allowances. For a trading 
program to be successful, appropriate boundaries must be set for the trading zone. 
The coverage of these boundaries can affect the potential cost savings and 
improvements in water quality (NSW EPA, November 1994). Generally, the greater the 
number of sources targeted by a permit system, the greater the likelihood the permits 
will be actively traded among firms (Government of Canada 1992). If the trading area is 
very small and few dischargers are included, there may be limited opportunities for 
trading. However, in over-large trading areas, monitoring and enforcement may be 
difficult, and local 'hotspots', a problem. 
Both calculation and allocation of TMLA in the Nanpan did not consider the difference 
of water quality effects of dischargers at different locations due to lack of instream 
purification data and instream flow analysis. YIES (1995) gave TMLAs for each subzone 
separately. It would be preferable to circumscribe the trading zone not only to avoid 
remarkable environmental 'hotspots' - localized areas in which instream water quality 
standards are exceeded, but also to make the trading market thick enough. 
With regard to the distribution of existing and future dischargers, it would be pragmatic 
to establish a demonstration trading program within the instream Subzones 3 and 4- 
a total channel length of 38 km. Pollutant discharges are prohibited within the first 
subzone in order to maintain the water quality of Huashan reservoir. Most of the 
dischargers along the upper Nanpan river are within subzone 3 and 4, and the channel 
distance between their discharge cores (Xiping town and the urban center) are relatively 
short. There are few dischargers in Subzones 2 and 5. 
3.4.4 Participants 
Ideally, from an environmental and economic standpoint, all sources of pollution 
within the trading zone would be included in a given trading program. Frequently, however, 
it would be administratively costly and impractical to include directly many small sources 
(Government of Canada 1992). It would be more cost-effective to include the larger 
sources in the permit program on a mass load control basis, while applying concentration 
control to the smaller sources (Tao 1995). 
Point sources in the trading system turn up in two classes, industrial dischargers 
and municipal sources. The trading system could contain all the 18 existing industrial 
participants of the non-tradable permits system in the trading zone and the two major 
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municipal sources (Table 4). Also, future industrial dischargers could be brought into 
the trading program. If all the pollution credits were issued in the initial allocation, then 
anybody who made an application to develop a new pollutant source, or to increase 
discharges from an existing source, would first need to purchase sufficient credits from 
existing market players (NSW EPA, March 1994). 
3.4.5 Total Maximum Daily Loads and Initial Allocation of Permits 
YIES (1995) gave each subzone a TMLA during low-flow conditions that could be 
considered in implementation of the trading program. The TMLAs in low-flow conditions 
do not take into account the contribution of nonpoint sources and could then be 
apportioned to the point sources within the trading zone. 
The initial allocation will affect the bargaining power of participants in a trading 
program (e.g., by determining which participants start out with the largest allowances), 
and therefore needs to be designed carefully to support the program's goals (US EPA, 
May 1992). Several methods for allocation of permits under non-tradable systems are 
described in relevant official guidelines in China. 'Grandfathering' is commonly used for 
initial allocation of permits, as in the case in the upper Nanpan river. 
As a matter of fact, there are a few methods for permits allocation that appear 
appropriate for the tradable permits system-modifying the current allocations, rewarding 
existing dischargers that have already finished their deadline control requirements, 
growth/entry that adopt cleaner production and/or China's best practical environmental 
technology, and auction, among others. It is no simple matter to select the most relevant 
for particular cases. Hence, alternatives for initial allocation of permits is hereafter 
identified as an important concern to be addressed in later stages. To simplify the 
benefit analysis, existing allocations are used to estimate the cost savings of trades at 
the present stage. 
4.0 BENEFITS OF TRADING PROGRAM FOR THE UPPER NANPAN 
The cost-effectiveness of a TDP system must be analyzed, and compared to those 
of the non-tradable system to examine the social benefits of the trading system. 
Estimation of any TDP system's benefits is difficult before the system is actually in 
place, for the actual level of benefits depends largely on the extent of trading (US EPA, 
May 1992). In addition, even if the program had been designed to encourage stronger 
trade, dischargers may have chosen not to participate in trades for reasons beyond the 
program's scope (US EPA, May 1992). The research intends to help the governments 
and industries accept the TDP system by illustrating the benefits from trading rather 
than giving an exact estimation of benefits. 
4.1 Target Load Reduction Requirements 
Since BOD5 is not regulated by the current permits system (i.e., no wasteload 
allocation was undertaken), benefits analysis puts emphasis on COD discharges of the 
participants within the trading zone. 
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Table 4. Target Reduction of the Existing Participants for COD Discharge 







QUC 9966.60 1158.90 1542.21 
XT 385.55 8424.39 773.35 
Industrial Dischargers 
1. QMB 77.00 29.41 47.59 
2. QMPCP 0.06 0.00 0.06 
3. ZARF 5.35 5.35 0.00 
4. ZPFP 23.05 0.00 23.05 
5. ZWTM 64.00 80.88 -16.88 
6. GPM 296.38 39.32 257.06 
7. KPP 0.35 0.01 0.34 
8. LAF 94.20 94.20 0.00 
9. QCF 857.00 88.85 768.15 
10. QHTS 41.00 14.15 26.85 
11. QMBP 54.00 7.55 46.45 
12. QMFC 113.12 3.65 109.47 
13. QMLTP 99.54 29.57 69.97 
14. QPIMP 46.76 2.98 43.78 
15. QPMP 0.07 0.07 0.00 
16. QPPP 270.59 28.96 241.63 
17. QTPP 1.67 1.67 0.00 
18. QTM 1.07 1.07 0.00 
Sum 3170.71 2355.45 10815.26 
Actual discharges are as of 1993; permit limits allocated with the TMLAs by year 2000 are quoted from 
OLGTPS (1993). 
Code of Dischargers: 
QUC -Qujing Urban Center, XT-Xiping Town, QMB -Qujing Municipal Brewery, QMPCP -Qujing Municipal Phosphate Chemical 
Plant, ZARF -Zhanyi Automobile Repairing Factory, ZPFP -Zhanyi Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, ZWTM -Zhanyi Wool Textile Mill, 
GPM -Guihua Paper Mill, KPP -Kangli Pharmaceutical Plant, LAF -Lanjian Automobile Factory, QCF -Qujing Cigarette Factory, 
QHTS -Qujing Highway Transportation Station, QMBP -Qujing Municipal Beverage Plant, QMFC -Qujing Municipal Food Company: 
Processing Plant, QMLTP -Qujing Municipal Leather-Tanning Plant, QPIMP -Qujing Prefectural Incorporated Meat Plant, QPMP 
-Qujing Prefectural Machinery Plant, QPPP -Qujing Prefectural Pharmaceutical Plant, QTPP -Qujing Tobacco-Processing Plant, 
QTM -Qujing Textile Mill. 
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Among the permits system, 18 industrial participants in the trading zone, ten 
dischargers face significant COD load reductions, one holds excessive allowances, 
and one has no reduction requirement. All of the 12 industrial dischargers plus the two 
main municipal sources are potential participants of the trading program. Six dischargers 
have achieved negligible discharge level and would participate in the trading program 
unless allowances are rewarded during the reallocation process. Therefore, only the 
potential participants of the trading program are involved hereinafter. 
4.2 Pollution Reduction Options and Costs 
Although no reduction cost vs. pollutant discharge curves exist for catchment 
dischargers, various pollution reduction options and the costs associated with different 
reduction levels could be identified from many data sources. Selection of reduction 
options and cost-effectiveness analysis were conducted in detail (Appendix 2). 
The annual reduction cost, the sum of annualized capital cost and annual operation 
and maintenance (O&M) cost, is employed to compare the total cost of pollution reduction 
options. Conversion of one-time capital costs to annual equivalent capital costs allows 
consistent comparison of the total costs of reduction options. Annual capital cost is 
derived from the following formula: 
k 
Initial Investment = E (Annual Capital Cost/(1+r)') 
t=1 
where r is the discount rate and k capital recovery period. The wastewater treatment 
plants (WTPs) or facilities (WTFs) are assumed to depreciate over a 20-year period 
and the discount rate is then 5%. Capital cost of industrial dischargers embraces costs 
of wastewater collection system, civil construction, equipment and installation of WTP/ 
WTFs, and waste-reclamation. Capital cost for municipal sources mainly includes land 
cost, civil construction cost, and equipment and installation cost. The principal elements 
of O&M are labor, energy, chemicals, materials and supplies. 
To seek options that appear feasible in actual circumstances, the pollution reduction 
options and associated annual costs are obtained in the following process: 
Characterize participants' wastewater with existing available information/data. 
Evaluate the existing wastewater collection system, wastewater treatment facilities 
and internal water-reuse system with respect to capacity, processes, design snags 
and operational problems, and identify the remaining problems. 
Select water pollution reduction options. Most of the options are derived from the 
reference data/information sources. The most common sources include existing 
research reports, environmental impact statements, feasibility study reports, design 
specification, permits application documents, and government guidelines for best 
practical environmental protection technologies and cleaner production processes. 
Wendong Tao, Weimin Yang & Bo Zhou 25 
EEPSEA Research Report Series 
Develop the annual reduction costs of each option using cost transfer method. This 
transfers unit cost adjusted to better reflect the conditions of the target reduction by 
a coefficient. All costs are converted to 1990 CNY, using the official composite price 
index. The sources used are relatively detailed and developed for local conditions. 
Hence, it is felt that they provide a reasonable approximation of actual reduction 
costs for the individual polluters considered in the study. 
All reduction levels in Appendix 2 connote reduction from the current mass loading 
to the level corresponding to a specific engineering option. The options in Appendix 2 
are those optimum feasible options relative to certain reductions, and the reductions to 
nearly 'nil discharge' or permit limit are sought. For this reason, it may be possible to 
find a few options for most of the participants so that a smooth incremental cost curve 
would not develop. Therefore, unit costs are used to identify trading opportunities. 
4.3 Identification of Trading Opportunities 
The trading opportunities are identified by comparing the unit costs as illustrated in 
Figure 2. In principle, effluent trading allocates pollutant load reductions across point 
sources using least cost as the criterion. So identification of trading opportunities starts 
at selling the excessive reduction due to the cheapest option. The most likely trade 
would occur when the participant with the highest unit cost to meet its permit limits 
offers the highest permit price for a unit excessive allowance on sale by the one with 
the lowest unit cost. There are exceptions to the rule, especially as the reduction limit is 
neared. Consequently, it is assumed that the participant with the most expensive option 
is the first to buy such a unit excessive allowance on sale. 
Table 5. Scale of Pollution Control Cost Relative to Cost of Industrial Products 
Code of Annual reduction cost Code of Annual reduction cost 
Participant to meet permits/ Participant to meet permits/Industrial 
Industrial product value product value 
QMB 0.64% QHTS 0.10% 
ZPFP 0.65% QMBP 0.33% 
ZWTM 0 QMFC 0.32% 
GPM 7.33% QMLTP 0.04% 
LAF 0 QPIMP 0.22% 
QCF 0.04% QPPP 0.44% 
Note: Annual reduction costs see Table 6. Industrial products are as of 1993 
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Rank all the options according to unit cost 
from the most expensive to the cheapest 
Can the cheapest option make 




Delete those options for each participant which reduce 
discharges by an amount smaller than the cheapest option 
Delete options which are not extensions of the cheapest option; replace deleted 
ones with options which are incremental extensions of the cheapest option 
I 
Sell the excessive reduction from the cheapest option to the 
participant(s) with the most expensive option(s) to meet permit limits 






oes the buyer get enough allowances to meet permit limits 
N 
Are the other options of the seller 
extended from the sold option? 
No Yes 
Delete all options of the seller 
from the ranking 
Yes 
Delete the options of the 
buyer from the ranking 
Delete the sold option; replace with 
other options and their extensions 
Figure 2. Illustration of the Process of Identifying Trading Opportunities 
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At the start of the current non-trading permits system, the actual load of a participant 
was either larger than or equal to the allowance. A specific control technology might 
result in a participant having excessive allowances. Nonetheless, few dischargers are 
assumed to solely seek financial gain by upgrading their treatment facilities and selling 
the excessive allowances, considering the low proportions of the cost needed to meet 
permit limits to the cost of industrial product (Table 5). This assumption is justified by 
the Fox River experience. The options of the buyer are then deleted from the ranking if 
the buyer gets enough discharge rights to meet its permit limits. 
The amount of allowance that could be traded should, of course, be large enough 
to install a certain unit treatment process. Therefore, the other options which are not 
extended from the sold option in the engineering viewpoint are deleted from the ranking. 
The other options which are extended from the sold option are substituted by the 
increments of reduction and cost. 
Although the research aims at examining the implications of trading in real settings, 
trading cases are hypothetical. The project is solely intended to illustrate the potential 
effect of such an alternative to the current permits system for water pollution control. 
4.4 Estimation of Cost-savings 
The potential annual benefit is equal to the direct cost savings obtained as the 
difference of the summation of annual costs of all participants to meet permit limits 
"without" trading and the summation of annual costs of all participants to meet permit 
limits "with" trading. The "without trading" approach requires each discharger to achieve 
its permit limits by upgrading WTFs; the "with trading" approach allows permit trading 
to be an alternative for the dischargers to achieve their permit limits. 
Without trading, the calculation of the total cost is relatively simple. It is obtained by 
getting the sum of the reduction in costs of all participants' option that could achieve the 
permit limits. Under a trading program, there are two choices for the dischargers to 
meet their permit limits -- upgrading their own WTFs or buying allowances. Thus, the 
calculation of the total cost with trading is the sum of the reduction in costs of those 
participants that could meet their permit limits by upgrading their own WTFs and the 
reduction in costs through trades, until the total reduction target is met. From the social 
economic perspective, buying or selling allowance just results in transfer payments. 
The project estimated the cost-savings per year in 1990 CNY. It would be simple to 
compute the present values, but that was not needed for this project. 
Exclusion of the municipal sources from the trading system may make the trading 
system forgoes trading benefits to some extent. On the contrary, however, inclusion of 
the municipal sources into the market might bring out monopolistic behavior. Therefore, 
both cases are considered while estimating the cost-savings from pollution reduction. 
If the municipal sources do not participate in the trading system, only one case of 
trade is likely to occur: ZPFP buys allowance of 23.1 kg COD/day for CNY7,177/year 
from GPM and incurs annual cost-saving of CNY163,239, or 1.7% of the total annual 
cost without trading. 
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If the municipal sources participate in the trading system, there will still be only one 
case of trade between the industrial participants (GPM sells to ZPFP), but several 
trades between the Qujing municipal source and industrial participants (QUC buys from 
GPM, QHTS, QMLTP, QMB, QCF, QPPP and QMBP), and one case between the Qujing 
municipal and Xiping town sources (XT sells to QUC) are possible. Under such cases, 
trading save CNY2,412,299/year, or 18.4% of the total annual cost to attain the TRT 
without trading. Therefore, the trading program should be designed to include the 
municipal sources. But to prevent potential monopolistic behavior of the municipal 
sources, an industrial congregation could be instituted, or the government could set 
interventions to the permit price, which ranges between the unit costs of the seller and 
buyer. Permit price would generally depend upon negotiation between the seller and 
buyer. 
Theoretically, trading makes the differential in unit costs approach zero across 
dischargers. The unit price of the last trade can approximately be considered the marginal 
pollution reduction cost of the upper Nanpan river catchment. If municipal sources 
participate in the trading program, that is CNY959/kg COD/day. 
Table 6. Illustration of Cost-effectiveness With and Without Trading to 
Meet Permit Limits-excluding municipal sources 














QMB 47.59 1/1 50.0 27446 50.0 27446 
ZPFP 23.05 2/GPM5 23.0 170416 23.1 7177 
ZWTM -16.88 / 0.0 0 0.0 0 
GPM 257.06 5/5 296.8 92220 273.7 85038 
LAF 0.00 / 0.0 0 0.0 0 
QCF 768.15 6/6 857.0 537350 857.0 537350 
QHTS 26.85 1/1 27.0 8375 27.0 8375 
QMBP 46.45 2/ 47.0 19166 47.0 19166 
QMFC 109.47 3/3 109.5 13058 109.5 13058 
QMLTP 69.97 2/2 85.0 40723 85.0 40723 
QPIMP 43.78 3/3 44.0 8660 44.0 8660 
QPPP 241.63 2/2 244.0 30721 244.0 30721 
Total 1617.12 783.3 948135 1760.3 777714 
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Table 7. Illustration of Cost-effectiveness With and Without Trading to 
Meet Permit Limits -including municipal sources 
Code of Required Selected Without Trading With Trading 
Participant Reduction Option Reduction Annual Cost Reduction Annual Cost 
kglday (Withoutl 
With trading) 
kglday CNY kglday CNY 
QUC 8424.39 43+GPM5+QH 
TS2+QMLTP2+ 
QMB2+QCF6+ 
9110.0 11344200 8424.4 9191898 
QPPP3+QMB3+ 
QMBP3+XT2 
XT 773.35 2/2 822.5 788800 804.5 771516 
QMB 47.59 1/2 50.0 27446 47.6 23186 
ZPFP 23.05 2/GPM5 23.0 170416 23.1 7177 
ZWTM -16.88 / 0.0 0 0.0 0 
GPM 257.06 5/5 296.8 92220 257.1 79881 
LAF 0.00 I 0 0 0.0 0 
QCF 768.15 6/6 857.0 537350 768.2 481661 
QHTS 26.85 1/1 27.0 8375 27.0 8375 
QMBP 46.45 2/2 47.0 19166 47.0 19166 
QMFC 109.47 3/3 109.5 13058 109.5 13058 
QMLTP 69.97 212 85.0 40723 70.0 33537 
QPIMP 43.78 3/3 44.0 8660 44.0 8660 
QPPP 241.63 212 244.0 30721 244.0 30721 
Total 10814.86 11715.8 13081135 10866.4 10668836 
Incentive-based policies typically assign a shadow price of zero to improvements 
that exceed the standard(s), while more crude command-and-control policies generally 
result in "overcontrol" beyond the standards (Oates et al. 1989). Similarly, it is found 
that'without trading' and 'with trading' will, due to specific pollution control engineering, 
bring about 900.9 kg/day and 51.5 kg/day of redundant reduction, respectively, beyond 
the required reduction if the municipal sources participate in the trading program. 
A fair comparison between incentive-based and command-and-control policies 
necessitates that any additional benefits associated with command-and-control policies 
be offset against the cost advantages enjoyed by their incentive-based counterparts 
(Oates et al. 1989). The benefit of additional reduction of 849.4 kg/day (900.9-51.5) 
could be monetized by the additional control cost, obtained as the product of additional 
reduction of 849.4 kg/day and the marginal cost of CNY959/kg COD/day. Thus, the net 
annual benefit arising from trading would be direct pollution reduction cost-savings 
minus benefit of additional reduction, or CNY1,597,724. 
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5.0 TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Other Concerns Important for Implementation 
Other concerns that are important for smooth and successful implementation of the 
TDP system are identified with reference to international experience and local realities, 
including program design, reporting and monitoring requirements, institutional/ 
administrative requirements, additional administrative and monitoring costs for trading, 
alternatives for reallocation of permits, and social implications. To keep the initial system 
relatively simple, these complex aspects would be addressed in depth at later stages. 
5.1.1 Design guidelines 
The enthusiasm for tradable permits was, in some cases like Shanghai, so great 
that policy action and implementation had advanced beyond the understanding of some 
fundamental design issues. Nevertheless, the program must be carefully designed not 
only to minimize the administrative and transaction costs imposed on dischargers and 
regulatory agencies, but also to ensure that trading does not result in degradation of 
local water quality. 
Factors influencing participation must be taken into account in designing the trading 
program. In particular, the regulatory agency's perceptions of the effects of trading on 
environmental quality, the likely monopolistic behaviors of the municipal sources that 
can inhibit trading by industrial dischargers, and the lifespan of permits. Environmental 
'hotspots' can be prevented partly by limiting the size of the trading area; another 
approach is for the regulator to review and approve all trades (NSW EPA, November 
1994) so as to keep the effect of trades on water quality under an acceptable level. 
Monopolistic behavior of municipal sources can be prevented by government intervention 
or by forming an industrial congregation. Too short a lifespan will be a disincentive to 
trading. However, if the lifespan of permits is too long, this will restrict flexibility within 
the trading system and make it more difficult for the regulatory authority to improve 
water quality (NSW EPA, November 1994). A five-year lifespan of permits seems proper 
for the Nanpan river. 
While designing permits, a requirement that permits be nontransferable on closure 
of point sources could accelerate improvements in water quality, but would reduce both 
the incentive to trade and, consequently, the environmental and economic gains from 
trading. 
At large, three points need to be kept in mind when designing the TDP program: 
Try to make provisions as explicit as feasible and minimize the points of administrative 
intervention; 
Try a pilot program in the aforementioned small area before proceeding to full- 
blown implementation; and, 
Tailor-make the program for localities, especially the development of market 
mechanism, role of government and economic background. Cultural and political 
factors often weaken the effectiveness of the approaches adapted directly from the 
Western (Barron and Cottrell) 
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5.1.2 Reallocation of permits 
Equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to 
initial permit distributions. The current permit system allocated TMLAs in 1992 according 
to the actual discharges of the participants. After five years, it is time to determine 
suitability of that allocation method. The most appropriate load reallocation method 
needs to be carefully selected, though many load allocation methods seem to be suitable 
to the trading program: equal percent treatment, equal percent treatment weighted 
according to locations, effluent standards weighted according to industrial sectors, 
auctioning, and negotiating. Auction seems to be the best method for preventing 
corruption. 
5.1.3 Compliance monitoring requirements 
To ensure that the TRT is met, the regulator must be given the power to review and 
approve individual trades; the traders are then responsible for reporting trades and 
monitoring. This helps managers keep track of the ownership of permits and compliance 
situation. Careful assessment of what to monitor and how to monitor it are essential in 
building an effective and workable system of environmental law (Barron and Cottrell 
1996). 
Monitoring systems are more effective and more cost-effective when government 
monitoring activities are supplemented by well-designed self-monitoring and information 
from the local community (Barron and Cottrell 1996). Whereas large facilities might be 
monitored continuously and for a wide range of pollutants, this is unlikely to be feasible 
(or cost-effective) for many small emission sources (Barron and Cottrell 1996). For 
smaller sources, the standard-setting and the monitoring program perhaps should be 
based on process or equipment requirements rather than point-of-discharge 
measurements (Barron and Cottrell 1996). 
5.1.4 Institutional structure and capacity-building 
Prior to implementation of the program, one important task is the specification of 
the relevant structure, responsibility, and mandates of a management agency. The 
management agency in charge of trading must have adequate statutory authority to 
allocate permits, reject trades that threaten local water quality, enforce compliance, 
and enact other permit provisions. The responsibilities of participants in the program 
must also be defined. Community consultation and education may be required to achieve 
acceptance of the trading program. 
The non-tradable permits of the city-owned industrial dischargers and province- 
and prefecture-owned dischargers are under the management and supervision of the 
QMEPB and QPEPB, respectively. They seem to be the most eligible management 
bodies for the trading program. 
5.1.5 Administrative and monitoring costs 
Several authors have commented on the potential importance of transaction costs 
in TDP markets (Hahn and Hester 1989; Tripp and Dudek 1989; US EPA, May 1992). 
The cost of development and administration of a trading program can be significant, 
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especially for large or otherwise complex waterbodies. The following principal classes 
of costs are common among most trading programs: 
monitoring and modeling beyond those needed under current policy; 
costs to allocate waste loads for the "with trading" case; 
government transaction costs associated with review and approval of individual 
trades; and, 
transaction costs, including search and information, and bargaining. 
Ten potential trading cases between the existing participants were identified in the 
trading zone of the upper Nanpan river. Additional costs for the pilot PS/PS TDP program 
may be low relative to the estimated pollution reduction cost-savings. 
5.1.6 Social implications 
While economic efficiency is an important ingredient in government policies and 
water pollution control strategies, equity considerations play an equally important role 
(NSW EPA, March 1994). In the case of the upper Nanpan river, pollution control has 
been concentrated on the participants of the permits system. Thus, there is a question 
of whether it is fair for the permit holders to carry the costs of improving water quality. 
Nonpoint sources could do this during high-flow seasons, and small industrial dischargers 
could enjoy the benefits of improved water quality without necessarily paying for the 
privilege. 
5.2 Follow-up Actions 
Though eight of the nine necessary conditions for PS/PS TDP are met by the upper 
Nanpan river, the following must be achieved before the trading system is operational: 
A computer information system to pool information and data on participants and 
instream water quality changes so as to help trading and management. 
More reliable TMLAs for the trading zone with the one-dimensional water quality 
model. 
A mechanism to provide the local EPBs with help to reallocate permits. 
A trading rulebook prepared in collaboration with the local EPBs. 
Dissemination of trading rules to the participants. 
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Appendix 1. Effluent Characteristics of Participants of Nontrading Permits System 
Crucial Pollutants COD In kg/day Ammonia Nitrogen in kg/day 
Name of Dischargers Actual Permit Required Actual Permit Required 
discharge limit reduction discharge limit reduction 
Municipal Sources 11331.52 1927.76 9403.76 561.92 224.46 337.76 
Industrial Dischargers 
In the Vicinity of Huashan Town 
Xuanwei Phosphorus Plant: Huashan 3.91 3.91 1.57 1.57 
Yunnan Vinylon Factory 1739.00 967.62 771.38 
Zhanyi Fertilizer Plant 1972.26 377.42 1594.84 1293.51 369.76 923.75 
In the Vicinity ofXiping Town 
Qujing Municipal Brewery 77.00 29.41 47.59 0.78 0.78 
Qujing Municipal Phosphate Chemical Plant 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Zhanyi Automobile Repairing Factory 5.35 5.35 
Zhanyi Phosphate Fertilizer Plant 23.05 0.00 23.05 
Zhanyi Wool Textile Mill 64.00 80.88 
In the Vicinity of Urban Center 
Guihua Paper Mill 296.38 39.32 257.06 
Kangli Pharmaceutical Plant 0.35 0.01 0.34 
Lanjian Automobile Factory 94.20 94.20 
Qujing Cigarette Factory 857.00 88.85 768.15 
Qujing Highway Transportation Station 41.00 14.15 26.85 
Qujing Municipal Beverage Plant 54.00 7.55 46.45 
Qujing Municipal Food Company: 
Processing Plant 113.12 3.65 109.47 
Qujing Municipal Leather-Tanning Plant 99.54 29.57 69.97 
Qujing Prefectural Incorporated Meat Plant 46.76 2.98 43.78 
Qujing Prefectural Machinery Plant 0.07 0.07 
Qujing Prefectural Pharmaceutical Plant 270.59 28.96 241.63 
Qujing Tobacco-processing Plant 1.67 1.67 
Qujing Textile Mill 1.07 1.07 
In the Vicinity of Yuezhou Town 
Qujing Chemical Plant 58.61 58.61 94.32 94.32 
Yuezhou Iron and Steel Works 36.89 36.89 
Subsum 5240.14 1872.14 3368.00 1390.18 466.43 923.75 
Firms Gone to Bankrupt 
Qujing Dying & Printing Mill 77.06 77.06 
Qujing Municipal Paper Mil 6434.10 550.41 5883.69 
Qujing Silk Plant 56.04 56.04 
The Other Sources 482.47 89.16 
Sum 23754.6 4965.8 18788.8 1952.10 780.05 1261.51 
Note: Actual discharge as of 1993; Permit limits are allocations based on the total maximum loads allowable by year 2000 quoted from 
OLGTPS (1993). 
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Annual cost, CC 'oad Unit cost, 
Y n, C Yk f ay 
14,150 225 6289 
18,938 45 4208 
21,650 80 270.6 
63,463 2288 2774 
92,220 296.8 3107 
87,737 40 2193.4 
106,250 47 2260.6 
183,437 94.2 19473 
71,795 228 3149 
115,987 352 329 5 
161,074 404 398.7 
277.205 531 522 0 
3577,410 712 5020 
537,350 857 6270 
8.375 27 310.2 
14,150 41 3451 
27,446 50 5489 
27 765 "s7 48x".1 
42.669 77 554.1 
14,722 36 4089 
19,166 47 407 8 
24,555 54 454 7 
8,590 97 886 
10,246 1 04 9&5: 




Annual cost, COD load Unit cost, 
CNY reduction. 
kg/day 
C Y/k 9 y 
17,320 20 866.0 
40,723 85 479.1 
5,245 37,5 139.9 
7160 42 1705 
8;660 44 1968 
11 740 80 146.8 
30,721 244 125 9 
50,073 270 6 185.0 
2,637,600 3.003 878.3 
6 769,000 7,308 926.2 
9,056,600 8,209 11033 
11,344,200 9110 12452 
309,000 352,5 876.6 
788,800 822.5 959.0 
1,065,300 940 1133.3 
1,341,900 1057.5 12689 
18294 53 3451.7 
170,416 2305 7393.3 
135,500 673 20134 
13,845 5,8 2367.1 
24,152 138 17501 
£1,535 36.5 16859 
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